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THE NUDGING BALLOT? A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSOR FOLEY
LISA MARSHALL MANHEIM*
For those committed to greater “equality of campaign
discourse,”1 Edward Foley offers a shrewd proposal: Stop trying to
limit speech in preexisting forums. The Supreme Court simply won’t
allow it. Instead, Professor Foley suggests, create new forums—
forums that even the Supreme Court is likely to concede may be
subject to equality-promoting measures—and tailor them as needed.
For Professor Foley, the first place to turn is the ballot. The state
could transform that space from what it is now (according to the
Supreme Court, a state-controlled tool for electing candidates, not a
“forum for political expression”)2 into a digitized forum for speech.
By analogy to the broadcasting precedents,3 Professor Foley argues,
the government would be free to set the terms of the debate.
Professor Foley’s central insight is powerful, and his turn to the
ballot both thought-provoking and creative. Though the Supreme
Court has repeatedly expressed its aversion to the government
interjecting itself “into the debate over who should govern,”4 the
implementation of a “speaking ballot” seemingly would have a
stronger case for constitutionality under current doctrine than do
many of the existing, beleaguered restrictions on campaign-related
speech.5 Moreover, the speaking ballot appears to have the potential
* Copyright © 2014 by Lisa Marshall Manheim, Assistant Professor, University of
Washington School of Law. I am deeply grateful to Ned Foley for the opportunity to join
this debate and also to the Brennan Center for hosting the conference that inspired this
symposium. My gratitude extends, in addition, to Kate Andrias, Ryan Calo, Ron Collins,
Johanna Kalb, Liz Porter, and Zahr Said for their insights regarding this response.
1 Edward B. Foley, The Speaking Ballot: A New Way to Foster Equality of Campaign
Discourse, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 52 (2014).
2 See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 363 (1997) (“Ballots
serve primarily to elect candidates, not as forums for political expression.”); see also Wash.
State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 461 (2008) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (stating that the Court never has considered the ballot a public forum).
3 See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (upholding
limits on participation in publicly broadcasted candidate debate).
4 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
5 Cf. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 676 (confirming, in the context of a state-owned public
television broadcaster sponsoring a candidate debate, that reasonable, viewpoint-neutral
exercises of the state actor’s discretion are constitutional). The Supreme Court also has
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to influence elections.6 It is rare, in the world of campaign-related
speech, to encounter proposals for reform that enjoy both these
qualities: the potential to make a difference and the ability to secure
five votes from the Roberts Court. As a result, those committed to
greater equality in the speech market are well advised to accept
Professor Foley’s inspired invitation to explore new speech forums.
At the same time, ushering in a new era for ballots—transforming
them from a utilitarian tool into a heavily regulated forum for
speech—comes at a potentially high cost. While the speaking ballot
may, in fact, affect elections, that influence may be due less to a
flourishing of informed and reasoned debate and more to the
exploitation of subtle forms of voter manipulation.
The speech of Professor Foley’s proposed forum, which must
compete with so many others in order to be effective, has a significant
advantage: It is delivered via one of the most important and
influential tools in a democracy. And that is the ballot.7 As Professor
Mary Beth Beazley has explained, when government actors design a
ballot, they become, to quote Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein,
“‘choice architects,’”8 and, as such, “they must be aware that ‘small
indicated, in a different context, that “last-minute campaigning” is more likely to be
protected than prohibited by the Constitution. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 217–18
(1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 220 (1966)
(holding that a newspaper could not be barred from running an election-day editorial
attempting to persuade readers how to vote). It nevertheless remains possible that some
variation of Professor Foley’s proposal, as implemented, could fall before a novel
constitutional challenge, cf. Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 465 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging constitutional concerns that can arise in light of the “special role that a
state-printed ballot plays in elections”); id. at 460 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“[W]hat
makes the ballot ‘special’ is precisely the effect it has on voter impressions.”), particularly
if future litigants were to fashion their lawsuit as an as-applied challenge, cf. id.; 552 U.S.
442 (2008) (rejecting a facial challenge to an allegedly confusing ballot format while
acknowledging that a later as-applied challenge might be successful). Presumably, the
strength of such a challenge would depend in part on how much control, and what type of
control, the state had attempted to exercise over the speech contained in the ballot. Cf.
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441–42 (articulating concerns over the Government
“impermissibly inject[ing]” itself into “the debate over who should govern” and insisting
that “those who govern should be the last people to help decide who should govern”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
6 The speaking ballot may influence elections through the facilitation of speech, as
Professor Foley so eloquently explains. See Foley, supra note 1, at 53. Yet, as discussed
below, the adoption of a speaking ballot also may affect elections by increasing the
opportunity for design-related nudging and manipulation.
7 See, e.g., E. Scott Adler & Thad E. Hall, Ballots, Transparency, and Democracy, 12
ELECTION L.J. 146, 148 (2013) (confirming that, in the transition away from the “vote
market” that had dominated American politics prior to the late 1800s, the most important
reforms involved ballot design and regulation).
8 Mary Beth Beazley, Ballot Design as Fail-Safe: An Ounce of Rotation Is Worth a
Pound of Litigation, 12 ELECTION L.J. 18, 19 (2013) (quoting RICHARD H. THALER &
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and apparently insignificant details can have major impacts on
people’s behavior.’”9 Professor Beazley discusses, for example, the
errors that voters tend to make in response to particular ballot-design
flaws, as well as the tendency of some voters to vote for whichever
candidate happens to be listed first on the ballot.10 Drawing on
empirical research demonstrating the effect of such votes,11 Professor
Beazley’s work helps to confirm the significance of each and every
seemingly innocuous decision surrounding the design and
implementation of any ballot.
For choice architects employed by a Secretary of State’s office,
the transition to a speaking ballot would introduce a host of new
decision points. Must, for example, the state ensure that all videos
load at the same speed? Presumably it must. But what if a state
official slows down all load times after realizing that an opposition
party’s candidates have a particularly effective batch of videos in a
given election? And there are, of course, many appearance-related
options. Who, for example, chooses which photo or graphic will
appear to announce each video? Particularly flattering (or
unflattering) screenshots would have at least the potential to affect
close elections.12 What about timing? Would candidates be able to
update videos as the election draws closer? Could a state change its
rules on timing if some controversy emerged? The list of potentially
consequential rules and decisions is as deep as the creativity of those
seeking to exploit them. And they affect elections in ways that are
normatively troubling. As the work of Professor Beazley and others
has shown, these types of rules and decisions often prey on the
tendency of individuals to make “predictable mistakes” in their
interaction with visual information.13
It is into this sensitive area that Professor Foley proposes we
introduce not only speech, but digital speech. This turn to digital

CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND
HAPPINESS 3 (2008)); see also id. (explaining that the term “choice architects” describes
individuals who “design the structures that people use to exercise a choice”).
9 Beazley, supra note 8, at 19 (quoting THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 3).
10 Beazley, supra note 8, at 20–21. She terms these “position-influenced votes,”
defined as valid votes that were “influenced in some way by the position of particular
candidates within each contest” on the ballot. Id. at 20.
11 See, e.g., id. at 21 n.22–24 and accompanying text.
12 This discussion triggers another line of concerns: how featuring a candidate’s
appearance so prominently on the ballot might affect electoral outcomes. See, e.g., Carol
K. Sigelman et al., Gender, Physical Attractiveness, and Electability: An Experimental
Investigation of Voter Biases, 16 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 229 (1986) (analyzing the
impact of perceived physical attractiveness on female political candidates).
13 Beazley, supra note 8, at 29.
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media is both timely and sensible, for the digitalization of campaignrelated speech is already underway.14 Yet the potential for
manipulation is fast on its heels. Consider, for example, Jonathan
Zittrain’s description of an emerging phenomenon—which he terms
“digital gerrymandering”15—that might be exploited to influence
elections. Professor Zittrain points to a 2010 study in which
researchers found they could influence voting behavior through
simple tweaks to users’ Facebook accounts—a link to a polling place,
a button to click to indicate a user had voted, the selective display of
particular friends’ profiles. It is not hard to imagine the next step, as
Professor Zittrain adeptly does: Simply limit this get-out-the-vote
effort to those users whose political preferences appear to match the
intermediary’s, and—faster than a team of lawyers can attack a
collection of hanging chads—an election starts swinging.
The potential for such influence may be concerning, but it is not
surprising. Privacy scholars, such as my colleague Ryan Calo, have
offered vivid accounts of the potential for “digital market
manipulation,” where the “manipulation” in question refers to
deliberate efforts to nudge individuals toward certain outcomes
through the exploitation of irrational human tendencies.16 So defined,
digitally facilitated manipulation appears to be growing as quickly as
the implementing technology will allow it. Website “morphing,” for
example, uses digital data to match a particular individual with the
advertising pitch most likely to persuade her to act—an
implementation of so-called “persuasion profiling.”17 While it may be
impossible to pinpoint exactly why individuals tend to respond to
such seemingly slight tweaks to an advertisement’s messaging (text
rather than images, or an appeal to popularity rather than some other
frame), irrationality tells at least part of the tale; it is otherwise hard
to understand, for example, how subtly blending a photograph of a
politician with the photograph of a subject tends to make that subject
14 See, e.g., Jim Rutenberg, Data You Can Believe in, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2013
(Magazine), at 22 (describing how staffers used digital data, along with other resources, to
develop highly effective marketing techniques for President Obama’s reelection
campaign).
15 See Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335, 336
(2014), http://harvardlawreview.org/2014/06/engineering-an-election/ (defining digital
gerrymandering as the “selective presentation of information by an intermediary to meet
its agenda rather than to serve its users”).
16 Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1000–03
(2014). Professor Calo’s article begins with the seminal work of Jon Hanson and Douglas
Kysar before overlaying it with the prospect of systematic, digitally enabled
personalization. Id.
17 Id.
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more inclined to trust the politician.18
Professor Foley’s speaking ballot is, of course, not Facebook.
And his calls for easily accessible campaign videos and mediated
debates among candidates are a far cry from the intentionally
intrusive, personalized attempts at digital manipulation that are
beginning to emerge in the private sector. That said, even Professor
Foley’s more tempered proposal quickly leads to difficult questions
related to privacy and manipulation—such as who, if anyone, might
be entitled to access speaking-ballot metadata, which presumably
would yield invaluable insight into how voters chose to interact, or
decline to interact, with the relevant media and how that might have
affected their votes. Moreover, it is not clear whether or how
techniques that lead to nudging should be regulated in this context.
At core, the purpose of the speaking ballot is not to facilitate weakly
effective speech, but rather to facilitate speech that can compete with
outside campaign discourse. And it is hard to compete when only the
latter type of discourse can incorporate the most effective forms of
nudging available.
In short, Professor Foley, through his call for the facilitation,
rather than the limitation, of campaign-related speech, advances a
powerful insight. And by combining the ballot with digital
technology, he very well may have identified the rarest of creatures: a
potentially effective and constitutionally permissible counterweight to
other forms of campaign-related speech. The reform-minded
nevertheless should tread carefully. “That the current information
landscape has its distortions . . . is no reason to entertain the idea of
adulterations from new quarters.”19

18 For a discussion of a study that exposed participants to images of well-known
politicians subtly blended with photographs of the participants themselves, see id.
19 Zittrain, supra note 15, at 340–41 (footnote omitted).

